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 To enhance the safety and reliability of a new reactor, human factors 
should be integrated into its design process. The experimental power 
reactor (RDE) currently being developed in Indonesia needs to include 
human factors in the design process. One approach to incorporate human 
factors into design is by considering reactor operational experience data. 
This paper reviews and analyses the operational experience data of 
RSG-GAS reactor. The operational experience data of RSG-GAS 
reactor with 40,435 hours of total operation time spanning from 2003 to 
2013 was used as a base in the study. In depth analysis on human factors 
was applied to the primary cooling system using Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System-HFACS method. An amount of 289 
un-intended trips were found in the observation data period. Most of un-
intended trip were caused by external factors (38%). A review on the 
primary and secondary cooling system operational data showed that 
3.11% of un-intended reactor trip occurrence causes were associated 
with human failure. Most suspected human failure/human error 
corresponds to the pump maintenance task which is classified as A 
action category. Analysis on the cooling system based on HFACS 
showed that the challenges to the human factors are related to unsafe 
acts, preconditions of unsafe acts, and unsafe supervision. The result 
reaffirm that human factors should be treated appropriately in the design 
of reactor equipment and operation procedure as well. 
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INTRODUCTION∗ 
Comprehensive approaches were applied to the 
design process of a new reactor in order to enhance 
the operation safety and performance. One of this 
approach is carried out by integrating human 
factors into design, which can be realized through 
consideration of the reactor operational experience 
review and analysis [1, 2]. The need to incorporate 
human factors in the reactor design process has 
been stated in several documents and design 
                                                            
∗Corresponding author. Tel./Fax.: +62-217560912 
 E-mail: sigitsan@batan.go.id 
 DOI: 10.17146/tdm.2019.21.2.5300 
standards, since the safety performance does not 
depend only on technical matters but also on human 
performance [2–4].  
Many researches engaged in reactor safety 
have made the effort to provide lesson learned from 
reactor operational experience, particularly during 
accidents [1, 5, 6]. It is widely accepted that poor 
human performance is a major cause of incidents 
and accidents [7, 8]. Therefore, methods for 
assessing human performance and contributing 
factors to the error in conducting reactor operation 
were extensively developed. The approaches were 
exceptionally broad and covered many aspects such 
as personal cognitive, communication, 
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organization, human interface, and team personel 
[9–12].  
The 10 MWth experimental power reactor 
(RDE) is currenty being developed in Indonesia. To 
enhance the safety and reliability of the RDE, a 
comprehensive aspects should be considered 
including human factors. The analysis of the 
operational experience were conducted on several 
reactors in order to implement the human factor 
programs in the design process [4, 13]. However,  
relevant informations and research results 
correspond to human factors required in the RDE 
design process were very limited. Most operational 
evaluation and analysis conducted were related to 
the neutronics and thermalhydraulics aspects [14, 
15]. Other analyses on the operational experience 
data were emphasized on the challenge due to 
components reliability and ageing phenomena [16, 
17]. In many aspects, human factors tend to be 
specific and influenced by local population 
characteristics [18, 19]. Therefore, an analysis and 
research based on operation experience data of 
local existing reactors is essential.   
This research was aimed to analyse and review 
human factors in the operation of RSG-GAS 
reactor. In this study, human contribution to the un-
intended reactor trip (reactor scram) was analysed 
based on the operational experience data of RSG-
GAS. The RSG-GAS was selected as the object of 
the study since its operation is considered to be 
more complex compared to other two research 
reactors managed and operated by BATAN. In 
accordance to the purposes of this study, it is 
necessary that the investigations of human factors 
should consider a methodology to find out not only 
human tangible behavior but also intangible 
behavior such as organizational behaviors [10, 12, 
20]. Therefore, in-depth analysis was carried out to 
the cooling system as a sample case by using 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) approach to identify the causes of errors 
and corresponding performance influencing factors. 
In the analysis we employ RSG-GAS reactor 
operational experience data from 2003 to 2013. 
The result presented in this paper would be 
essential to develop a detailed design of human-
machine interface of the control room of RDE as 
well as in conducting reactor operation. Moreover it 
can also be considered for improving the 
operational management to enhance the safety 
operation of RSG-GAS. Further analysis on human 
factors performance in reactor operation needs 
more specific additional information data that 
should be prepared and included to the reactor 
operational experience database.  
 
THEORY 
RSG-GAS Research Reactor Operation 
The design document and safety analysis 
report showed that RSG GAS design which was 
developed more than 30 years ago has also 
considered human factors in the design [21]. 
During normal condition, the operation of RSG-
GAS is categorized as the following types: start-up, 
low power reactor operation, high power operation, 
power change/maneuvering, shutdown, and reactor 
scram.  
To maintain the operator performance in 
conducting operation task, a shift work system is 
applied on RSG-GAS operation. Daily operation is 
divided into 3 operation shifts, each shift covers 
eight operation hours. One shift consists of at least 
one supervisor, two operators, one radiation 
protection officer, and one technical 
service/maintenance worker. To carry-out the 
reactor operation, there are 11 supervisors, 21 
operators, 20 staffs as maintenance technicians, and 
9 maintenance supervisors belong to the operation 
organization. Qualifications and required training 
for personnel working in the reactor facility are 
established and described in BAPETEN Chairman 
Regulation No.6 of 2013 [22].  
The RSG-GAS reactor power control system is 
carried out by maneuvering 8 control rods inside 
the core, manually or automatically. The control 
activities are performed by using the provided 
reactor control desk, which also presented control 
rod status information consisting of control rod 
group (7 bank control rods) and a regulating control 
rod (1 rod). Control line from the operator will be 
stopped if the reactor protection system generates a 
scram signal, then control rod will be rapidly 
dropped and cause the reactor to shut-down/scram. 
The immediate emergency shut down or reactor 
scram is controlled by the reactor protection system 
unit [21]. 
The main components of the RSG-GAS 
reactor protection system (RPS) consist of data 
acquisition systems, analog systems, logic systems, 
and six contact systems (Figure 1). From the logic 
diagram, it is understood that reactor scram can be 
activated based on established reactor parameter 
measurements considered as safety critical. These 
parameters include a gamma dose rate in the reactor 
pool ventilation system, surface elevation of reactor 
pool water, primary isolation valve position, reactor 
core neutron flux density, and gamma dose rate in 
the primary system. Otherwise the scram can also 
be performed manually by the operator in the 
control room.
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Fig. 1. Scram logic diagram for the RSG-GAS reactor protection system [21] 
 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System 
IAEA Safety Series No. 50-P-10 differentiated 
human actions in three categories that are Category 
A, B and C. Category A of human actions or called 
pre-initiator associated to the actions that cause 
equipment or systems failure or unavailable when 
required. This pre-initiator is mainly related to the 
activities for preparation of equipment before 
operated including calibration, maintenance, 
replacement, etc. The category A can be explicitly 
modeled and are usually included in the system fault 
trees. Category B related to the actions that either by 
themselves or in combination with equipment failures 
lead to initiating events, or actions that contribute to 
initiating events. Category C human actions, which 
can be divided into three subtypes C1, C2, and C3 are 
associated with the human actions occurring post-
fault [1, 23].  
One of the most common human factors 
analysis framework is HFACS, which based on 
Reason’s Accident Causation Model and addressed to 
aviation accidents investigations and safety system 
development as well [24, 25]. Typically, HFACS is 
used as a retrospective tool for analyzing accident 
and incident reports. There are four levels of HFACS 
hierarchy, consist of unsafe acts, preconditions for 
unsafe acts, unsafe supervisions, and organizational 
influences. To apply the framework to the nuclear 
domain, the HFACS terminology used in aviation is 
necessary to be modified owing to the slightly 
different generic nature of the terminology. 
In contrast to the engine or components of high 
hazard system such as nuclear reactor, human factors 
tend to be complex, and their performances are also 
influenced by various factors. Analysis on human 
performances and influencing factors in HFACS are 
realized by implementing its four layers. The 
corresponding factors contributes to the performing 
task and subtask which broken down from the human 
role/function affecting the un-intended reactor trip are 
investigated based on the those layers. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 A total of 39 reactor operation cycles data 
spanning from 2003 to 2013 compiled and 
documented in RSG-GAS data system were used as 
object for investigation. The reactor operational 
experience data period were selected and screened 
out based on the completeness of scram 
information. From the selected data, un-intended 
reactor trip event was identified and its cause was 
analyzed. The particular cause of reactor trip are 
differentiated into five categories, namely 
availability of power supply, reactor flux and power 
detector, control rod drop, availability of pump at 
cooling system, and other factors. Then, HFACS 
was applied for in-depth analysis on the cooling 
system availability, as one of the internal cause of 
reactor scram occurence. The cooling system was 
selected since it was identified that human actions 
is very much prevalent in the system. Observation 
to the related documents such as maintenance and 
operation procedure, as well as discussion with 
operators was conducted in this step. During the 
analysis phase in order to conformize the detail 
human task and activities, and to identify the 
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performance-influencing factors, further discussion 
with supervisors and related experts were 
performed. Discussion and analysis were based on 
the influence of corresponding factors to the 
suspected human failure based on the four layers of 
HFACS, that are unsafe acts, pre-conditions for 
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
influence.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The operation experience data of RSG-GAS 
between year 2003 to 2013 were selected from the 
provided experience data. The screening was based 
on the completeness of information, such as scram 
event and its causes. In the selected period, a total 
of 40,435 operation hours were performed and 39 
core cycles were applied at RSG-GAS. 
The result from observation and document 
survey showed that human actions in the operation 
of RSG-GAS could be differentiated as actions 
related with direct operation in main control room 
(MCR), on site activities associated to the dose and 
components monitoring task, preparation of 
operation which includes core management, and 
activities related to the maintenance of reactor 
component/equipment. All of these activities 
possess the possibility to cause reactor trip if 
performed incorrectly. Investigation on the 
extracted operation data showed, in total, 289 un-
intended reactor trip occurred during the observed 
operation range. The highest number of un-intended 
scram, 48 times, occurred in year 2005, while the 
lowest scram occurrence is six times in year 2006. 
The data showed a specific trend pattern, that a 
significant decrement of scram frequency would 
take place in the next year after the year when the 
reactor experienced a large number of un-intended 
scram. This observation revealed that reactor 
organization management tend to apply reactive 
strategy to cope with the evidence of un-planned 
shutdown occurred in reactor facility. However, 
this approach showed its effectiveness to remove 
problems that initiated the un-intended reactor trip. 
The trend of un-intended trip number of RSG-GAS 
and the factors affected to the reactor scram in the 
period from 2003 to 2013 are presented in Fig. 2.
 
Fig. 2. Un-intended reactor trip frequency and the causes of trip during the observation period 
 
The cause and initiator of un-intended trip of 
RSG-GAS was categorized in five factors that are 
out of power supply, reactor flux and power 
detector, control rod drop, primary and secondary 
pump at cooling system, and other causes. Most of 
reactor scram was caused by external factor, which 
was unavailability of power supply (38%). Other 
causes which contributes 6% of reactor scram 
comprise of manual scram, purification system 
failure, radiation monitor trouble, improper object 
fell into the core, etc. Figure 2 shows the 
contribution of each category to the reactor scram. 
In conformity to the research purpose, the pump 
availability as one of cause of reactor scram was 
selected for in-depth analysis, since it was assumed 
that availability of pump strongly depend on the 
applied maintenance program where the sequence 
of human actions should be carried out. 
Identification results showed that 14% of reactor 
scram occurrence were caused by pump 
unavailability, contributed both by primary pump (6 
scrams) and secondary pump (33 scrams). Detailed 
investigation result corresponds to the pump 
unavailability is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Reactor scram number caused by pump 
unavailibility. 
 
 There is a number of scram initiation 
parameters designed for RSG-GAS safety 
protection system, where the associated 
components to those parameters should be 
maintained and or be inspected periodically. 
Among them including scram caused by primary 
pump failure, loss of power source, and manual 
scram. Therefore, the preventive maintenance was 
applied for the specific components such as valve 
and rotated component equipment. According to 
this function, human activities applied for a valve 
includes visual inspection, grease, 
cleaning/maintenance, and changing of spare parts. 
For the rotating equipment, maintenance activities 
consists of visual inspection, rotation assembly 
balancing, grease couplings, electric current 
measurement, checking the reactor protection 
circuit, and spare part replacement.  
 Considering the maintenance procedure 
applied to the RSG-GAS reactor, as well as 
specification and characteristics of the pump 
components, in this study we agree to justify 
several assumptions. A type human failure will 
probably exists (human error suspected-HES) in the 
maintenance task when a failure occurs at the same 
pump components and affects to the occurring of a 
reactor scram during a single reactor core 
operation, or during a consecutive reactor core 
operation configuration. Each of un-intended scram 
needs at least a single response task from operator 
to remove the existing failure causes and to prepare 
a successful operation.  
 Investigation on the scram/trip reactor caused 
by unavailability of primary pump showed that one 
of HES in maintenance (repair/remove or replace 
components) tend to exists in the total of 6 
conducted maintenance activities. On the other 
hand, an amount of 8 human error suspected also 
tend to exist during the maintenance of secondary 
pump. The result as listed in Table 1 showed that 
un-intended reactor trip caused by unavailibility of 
secondary pump occurred for 33 times (84%), 
where 24% of them tend to be contributed by 
human failure. Within the observation period, it 
was also found that 23% of A-type HES occurred in 
the maintenance activities of RSG-GAS cooling 
system. Large portion of identified human failure 
was caused by pump suddenly turned off, and 
failure in conducting the pump filter maintenance. 
Figure 3 presented the distribution of suspected 
human error in pump maintenance, and un-intended 
scram caused by unavailability of pump at reactor 
cooling system per operation year.  
 Observation on existing procedure of RSG-
GAS showed the distribution of task, role, and 
responsibility in conducting maintenance has been 
defined clearly. Maintenance and periodic testing 
are the responsibility of reactor manager, but can be 
delegated to the maintenance supervisor 
nevertheless. In accordance to the human failure in 
maintenance, the study identified that dominant 
factors influenced to A-category of human failure 
includes completeness of procedure, lack of 
supervisory, and fidelity in applying the procedure. 
Inconsistency in filling out the maintenance report 
form tends to initiate a failure in performing the 
next order of task activities. 
 The HFACS analysis of RSG-GAS is 
qualitatively summarized in Table 2. The causes of 
un-intended trip which identified as human failure 
were based on the four tiers of the HFACS 
framework: unsafe acts, pre-conditions for unsafe 
acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
influence. In accordance with the organizational 
factors, the availability of personal resources and 
financial resources are sufficiently provided in the 
organization of RSG-GAS in order to perform a 
required maintenance task. Safety culture in 
organization of RSG-GAS has been promoted 
intensively during the last decade. Self-assessment 
and re-inforcing program in safety culture were 
conducted annually by organization management. 
Therefore, unsafe acts, such as action violations 
which may affect to the performance in conducting 
operation and maintenance, can be minimized, even 
though it remains exist during observation period. 
Moreover, operators have adequate training 
relevant to their task, and therefore the occurence of 
knowledge based errors and failure in conducting 
diagnosis can be prevented.  
 Other two layers of HFACS, which are pre-
condition of unsafe acts and unsafe supervision are 
identified to be having contribution to the occurring 
of human failure in maintenance activities of 
cooling system. The issues of pre-condition of 
unsafe acts was found in practicing the task, such as 
too much reliance on the human operator and 
design performance (complacency). It can be 
recognized that in certain conditions, the formal 
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existing task procedure was not fully applied in the 
maintenance or repairing process, which then 
resulted the similar failure occurs in the next short 
time operation period. The availability of 
appropriate tools or equipment at a workplace when 
required may also contributes to the error in 
conducting a task. Unsafe supervision tend to exist 
in some of maintenance task, which affects the 
identified problem so that it was not entirely 
removed. However, in general, the supervisory role 
and task was clearly showed in performing the 
maintenance task of RSG-GAS. 
 
 
Fig 3. Un-intended reactor trip caused by pump unavailability, and HE suspected per operation year  
 
Table 2. The HFACS analysis of RSG GAS 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Review and analysis of the RSG-GAS reactor 
operation experience was conducted, where a total 
of 39 reactor operation cycles data from 2003 to 
2013 were selected and used as an object for 
investigation. The result showed that 289 
unintended reactor trip occurs during the operation 
period. Most of un-intended trip was caused by 
external factor, that is unavailability of power 
supply (38%). In-depth analysis on the primary 
cooling system showed that 3.11% of A-type 
categorized human failure tend to contributes to the 
un-intended reactor trip of RSG-GAS. The 
qualitative analysis with HFACS showed the 
dominant factors influenced to the suspected human 
failure include completeness of procedure, lacking 
in supervisory, and fidelity in applying the 
procedure. The result study is essential for 
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considering human factors in the design and 
operation management of a new reactor such as 
RDE. Further analysis is still needed to formulate a 
proper approach and required plan in reducing 
human error. Hence particular information intended 
to such purpose should be prepared and provided in 
the reactor operation experience database from the 
beginning. 
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